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Carol Ann Molino, the operator of an automobile owned by
her father, was killed in a one car accident which occurred on a
Putnam County highway. Prodoti, the only passenger, charged
the decedent with negligent operation of the vehicle and recovered
against her father, as absentee owner, in a federal district court.
Thereafter, decedent's mother who was not a party to the federal
action brought suit in her capacity as the administratrix of her
daughter's estate against Prodoti and Putnam County for her
daughter's Wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering. In
this action, commenced in New York supreme court, the administratrix charged Prodoti with negligent interference with the decedent's operation of the vehicle and Putnam County with negligent maintenance of the highway. Defendants moved to interpose an amended answer asserting an affirmative defense of collateral estoppel based on decedent's negligence as established
in the federal action. Special term denied the motion as to the
defendant County and granted it as to defendant Prodoti. Plaintiff, contesting the allowance of Prodoti's motion, appealed and
the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the special
term, holding that the defense of collateral estoppel was not available against this appellant since she was neither a party, nor in
privity with a party, to the federal action.' After the Court of
Appeals' decision in Schwartz v. Public Administrator of the
Bronx,2 the defendants renewed their motion for leave to plead
the defense of collateral estoppel based on the findings of the
federal action. Special term which had previously denied the
motion to Putnam County now granted the defendants' motion.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, which had previously denied the same motion, now affirmed without opinion. 8 On
plaintiff administratrix's appeal to the Court of Appeals, held:
1.

Molino v. County of Putnam, 30 App. Div. 2d 929, 294 N.Y.S.2d 158 (2d Dep't

1968).
2. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
3. Molino v. County of Putnam, 35 App. Div. 2d 578, 314 N.Y.S.2d 341 (2d Dep't
1970).
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the defense of collateral estoppel is not available against a
person who was neither a party to, nor in privity with a party
to the first action. Molino v. County of Putnam, 29 N.Y.2d 44,
272 N.E.2d 323, 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1971).
Stability and consistency, fundamental policies of both legal
and social order, demand that, at some point, litigation be finally and conclusively terminated. 4 To achieve this goal, the courts
have traditionally looked to former adjudications to dictate, or
at least influence, the outcome of subsequent litigations. The
doctrine of stare decisis has an influential effect in that it gives
the force of precedent to a prior ruling on a point of law which
will have a universal application.5 The doctrine of res judicata,
which embraces the concepts of bar, merger, and collateral
estoppel, 6 likewise seeks to effectuate these policies by prescribing the effects that an adjudication of fact in one action will
have in a subsequent action. 7 When the cause of action is the
same, 8 res judicata will fully preclude the relitigation of all issues which later arise either by bar, which prohibits a losing
plaintiff from suing again, 9 or by merger, where a successful
plaintiff's cause of action becomes merged and extinguished in
the judgment which is supplanted by a right to sue on the judgment. 10 However, unlike bar and merger which operate whether or not the facts were actually litigated, collateral estoppel will
only partially preclude relitigation in a subsequent and different
4. A terse statement of this policy is that "the interest of the state requires that
there be an end to litigation." Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1932).
5. People ex rel. Watchtower Bible Soc'y v. Haring, 286 App. Div. 676, 683, 146
N.Y.S.2d 151, 159 (3d Dep't 1955) ; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70, comment (a) (1942).
6. The New York courts, however, frequently fail to distinguish between its various
aspects and refer to res judicata indiscriminately. See, e.g., Goodman v. Goodman, 274
App. Div. 287, 83 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Ist Dep't 1948) (collateral estoppel discussed as res
judicata). For the purposes of this discussion, the term "res judicata" will be used to refer
to bar and merger, and is treated separately from collateral estoppel.
7. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
8. The determination that a cause of action in a present suit is identical to a
former is one of the most elusive distinctions in the area of res judicata. The decision
may ultimately turn on some delicate questions of policy. See, e.g., Spilker v. Hankin, 188
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; White v. Alder, 289 N.Y. 34, 43 N.E.2d 798 (1942).
9. Cromwell v. County of Sac. 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). (Bar occurs when the defendant prevails on the merits and the plaintiff is thereafter barred from suing again on
the same cause of action.)
10. RESTATEMENT oF JUDGMENTS § 47 (a) (1942). (Merger occurs when a plaintiff
prevails on the merits, his original cause of action is terminated by the judgment and is
replaced by a cause of action on the judgment.)
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cause of action by giving a conclusive effect to those facts actually litigated and determined in the former suit.1
In distinguishing between the availability of total claim preclusion by way of res judicata, or partial issue preclusion by way
of collateral estoppel, it therefore becomes necessary to determine
precisely what constitutes the "same cause of action."' 2 The traditional tests have included: the impairment of "rights or interests established in the first action"; 13 proof which is based
on the use of the same evidence in the latter action as in the
former;' 4 and election of remedies which are so inconsistent that
resort to one precludes resort to the other. 5 There is general
agreement that none of these tests are very helpful in determining, in a particular case, whether the requisite identity of issues
exists for an application of total preclusion, via bar or merger. 6
This has apparently led to an increased reliance on collateral
estoppel. The doctrine's limited effect of issue preclusion, based
on actual litigation, serves to eliminate the hardship of total
claim preclusion, while also avoiding most of the injustice which
7
may result from a relitigation of the same dispute.'
However, the availability of collateral estoppel has oftentimes been circumscribed by the injection of the coterminous
notions of mutuality and privity. The former operates to prevent
a stranger to a prior action from using collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of those findings which are favorable to him
because the newcomer would not have been bound to the determination of those issues had they been against him, 8 while
the latter determines who, in addition to the parties of record,
11. However, the New York courts may not always require "actual litigation." See
J. WVmNsTEw, H. KORN & A. MILE, NEv YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 5011.27 (1963).
12. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 61-67 (1942) ; see supra,note 8.
13. Schuykill Fuel Corp. v. B & C Neiberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 307, 165 N.E.
456,457 (1929).
14. Cook v. Conners, 215 N.Y. 175, 109 N.E. 78 (1915); Fox v. Employers' Liab.
Assurance Corp., 239 App. Div. 671,268 N.Y.S. 536 (4th Dep't 1934).
15. Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209 (1953).
16.

(1963).
17.
18.

See, e.g., J. WErNsrEr,

H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 5011.14

Id.
F. JAfMEs, CIvIL PROCEDURE § 11.23 (1965).

The rule is based on the traditional

due process precept that a person cannot assert a favorable judgment unless his right to

recover was placed in jeopardy in the former litigation vis-ht-vis the losing party.
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will be bound to a judgment. 19 While mutuality acts as a limitation on those who can assert collateral estoppel, 20 privity operates to restrict the class of persons against whom it can be invoked.2 ' The cumulative effect of these two concepts has been
to limit the applicability of collateral estoppel to instances where
successive litigations arise between the same parties or their
privies.2 Thus, since due process of law requires that one not
in privity with a party to the former suit shall not be bound,23 he
is similarly precluded, by mutuality, from using that prior determination affirmatively.2 4
However, in New York, the doctrine of mutuality has seemingly proved too restrictive to endure. Its demise began in Good
Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery,25 where the courts began carving out a series of exceptions which so undermined the
mutuality rule, that the Court of Apeals in B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v.

Hall pronounced it "dead" and "inoperative.

'2

New York law

now provides that where the issues in the second cause of action
are identical with those in the first action, collateral estoppel may
19. The term "privity" denominates a rule to the effect that under certain circum.
stances a person may be bound to a prior judgment to which he was not a party of record.
Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270,265 N.E.2d 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
122 P.2d 892 (1942).
21. The standard dogma holds that strangers to a judgment cannot be bound to
their disadvantage. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464 (1918); Neenan v.
Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933).
22. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96, comment (a) (1942). (The presence of an indemnity situation is often the decisive factor in deciding who is bound.)
23. Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590, 148 N.E.2d 136, 170
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1958). (State Insurance Fund was not bound by a prior finding that an
agent of the state was negligent.)
24. Kessler v. Fligel, 266 N.Y. 508, 195 N.E. 176 (1935); Atlantic Dock Co. v. Mayor
of New York, 53 N.Y. 64 (1873). But see Zdanok v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).

25. 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937). (Mutuality does not apply where liability is
wholly derivative.) For a thorough analysis of the fall of mutuality see, Rosenberg,
CollateralEstoppel in New York, 44 ST.JOHN's L. Ray. 165, 188-95 (1969).
26. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). The court suggests that
there are only three avenues of defense open to a loser in the first suit if he intends to
avoid the effects of collateral estoppel in the second:
(1) the issues are not identical;
(2) there was not a full and fair hearing on them; or
(3) the plaintiff lacks a "derivative" right.
Of these the first and third are of questionable value and the second is clearly the most
efficacious.
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be asserted either defensively or offensively by one who was neither a party nor a privy to the first litigation.27
Considerations separate and distinct from those of mutuality
occur when new parties appear as defendants in the second action.
Here, fundamental notions of due process preclude the assertion
of collateral estoppel against the newcomer, who was neither a
party to the first action, nor had an opportunity to be heard. 2
An exception to the general rule that "[a] judgment is a determination of the rights of the parties in an action,""9 provides that persons in "privity" with parties in the first action will
also be bound in the second action, without a violation of due
process, even though they were not physically before the court.30
Originally, privity was defined in terms of a relationship to
property.3 ' More recently, it has been described as "merely a
word used to say that the relationship between . . .one who is a

party on the record and another is close enough to' include ...
[the] other within the res judicata."32 Although time has amplified the language of the privity definition, the concept's facility
in creating a jural relationship and the legal consequences flowing therefrom has not enjoyed a corresponding expansion. Thus,
New York courts have continued to define privity in terms of
classic legalistic relationships, holding that: bailor and bailee are
in privity with respect to the subject of the bailment;3 3 bene84
ficiaries of a trust are bound by a suit brought by the trustee;
principal and agent are in privity where liability is purely de27. See, e.g., Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 255, 297 N.Y.S2d
639 (2d Dep't), af'd, 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969). (In an
action for wrongful death by city employees, a manufacturer was collaterally estopped from
denying negligence in later suit brought by decedent's rescuers.) ; Albero v. State, 31 App.
Div. 2d 674, 295 N.Y.S.2d 965 (3d Dep't 1968), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 630, 255 N.E.2d 724, 307
N.Y.S.2d 469 (1970). (Issue of plaintiff's negligence established in a federal action was

defensively asserted by defendant State, although the State was not a party to prior action.)
28. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464 (1918); Neenan v. Woodside
Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933).
29. N.Y. Civ. PPAc. § 5011 (McKinney 1963).
30. Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d 315
(1970).
31. Haverhill v. International Ry., 217 App. Div. 521, 522, 217 N.Y.S. 522, 523 (4th
Dep't 1926), aff'd, 244 N.Y. 582, 155 N.E. 905 (1927) (privity defined as a "mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property").
32. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3rd Cir. 1950).
33. Lanite Sales Co. v. Klevens Corp., 205 Misc. 303, 128 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
34. Stissing Nat'l Bank v. Kaplan, 28 App Div. 2d 1159, 284 N.Y.S.2d 320 (3d Dep't
1967); In re Clemen's Estate, 198 Misc. 1049, 101 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sur. Ct. 1950).
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rivative;-'

successors in interest to land are bound by a prior

determination of property rights thereto;38 control of litigation
is sufficient connection to bind a nonparty;37 and a right to control a litigation is sufficient to bind a party who was properly
vouched in.38 Conversely, the courts have found that privity does
not exist in such mundane relationships as those between: husband and wife;3 9 parent and child; 40 or the same person's in41
dividual and fiduciary capacities.
In New York, the application of these traditional privity relationships, which determine who, in addition to the parties, will
be bound by an unfavorable determination, has remained virtually unaffected in the closely related areas of class actions4 2 and
of indispensable parties4 3 despite other procedural modifications
in these areas. Similarly with respect to collateral estoppel, the
strength of the privity doctrine has remained virtually unaffected
by the demise of mutuality, its counterpart. 44
35. B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596
(1967).
36. In re Potter's Will, 307 N.Y. 504, 121 N.E.2d 522 (1954); In re Baker's Will, 189
Misc. 159, 69 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Sur. Ct. 1947).
37. New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Holland Laundry, 294 N.Y. 480, 63
N.E.2d 68 (1945).
38. Willsey v. Strawway, 44 Misc. 2d 601, 255 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1963), afl'd
mem., 22 App. Div. 2d 973, 254 N.Y.S.2d 830 (3d Dep't 1964).
39. Stamp v. Franklin, 144 N.Y. 607, 89 N.E. 634 (1895); Jetter v. Brown, 200 Misc.
718, 107 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
40. Willsey v. Strawway, 44 Misc. 2d 601, 255 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1963), all'd
mem., 22 App. Div. 2d 973, 254 N.Y.S.2d 830 (3d Dep't 1964); Salay v. Ross, 155 N.Y.S.2d
841 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
41. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Silberberg, 280 N.Y. 424, 21 N.E.2d 493 (1939),
42. In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) the Supreme Court dispensed with the
privity requirement for federal class actions by merely requiring notice and adequate
representation. The New York courts, however, continue to cling tenaciously to the privity
requirement, thereby seriously impairing the potential of the class action device. See Hall
v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970)
(privity requirement retained). See also, Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal
Rule, 71 CoLum. L. Rv. 609 (1971).
43. In Provident Trademens Bank v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968), a case involving
dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party, the Supreme Court seemingly reaffirmed the principle by saying:
There is the interest of the outsider whom it would have been desirable to join.
Of course, since the outsider is not before the court, he cannot be bound by the
judgment rendered.
Id. at 110.
44. Willsey v. Strawway, 44 Misc. 2d 601, 603, 255 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (Sup. Ct. 1963),
afr'd mem., 22 App. Div. 2d 973, 254 N.Y.S.2d 830 (3d Dep't 1964): "Rules involving
mutuality apply only to the party asserting res judicata. The rules regarding compliance
with the tests of identity or privity have been unchanged by recent law, as regards the
party againstwhom the estoppel is asserted."
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In Schwartz v. Public Administrator of the Bronx45 the

Court of Appeals apparently sought to introduce a functional approach to the application of collateral estoppel which would
look to the realities of each situation rather than to the traditional requirements of privity and mutuality. There the court
held that the drivers of two cars, codefendants when sued by a
passenger in the first action, were collaterally estopped in the
second suit inter se, even though they were not in the traditional
adversarial posture in the first action. The court announced that
the only requirements for the assertion of collateral estoppel were
an identity of interests and an opportunity to be heard.46 This
decision apparently confirmed the death of mutuality previously
announced in B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall 4T and sought to introduce
pragmatic requirements for the assertion of collateral estoppel.
It did not, however, deal specifically with a privity problem. 4
Therefore, although DeWitt and Schwartz have succeeded in
replacing the mutuality doctrine with more flexible criteria for
determining who may assert collateral estoppel,49 subsequent
cases have found the concept of privity, which delimits the class
of persons against whom the rule can be invoked, unaffected and
have continued to follow the traditional notions in deciding who,
in addition to parties of record, will be bound.50
The majority opinion in the instant case described the progressive expansion of the availability of collateral estoppel in
New York as a device to preclude the relitigation of a previously
determined issue. The court then noted that the abrogation of
mutuality now permits a judgment to be used either offensively
or defensively based on "'the sound principle that, where it can
be fairly said that a party has had a full opportunity to litigate a
particular issue, he cannot reasonably demand a second one.'-"The court, however, found the instant case to be one of first
impression in that it was the first instance in which a party in
45. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
46. Id. at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
47. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
48. The two drivers who faced each other as plaintiff and defendant in the second
action had both been parties, as codefendants, in the first action.
49. See, e.g., supra note 27.
50. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Zale Corp., 328 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). (Collateral estoppel does not apply against a person not represented in the first
action.)
51. Molino v. County of Putnam, 29 N.Y.2d 44, 48, 272 N.E.2d 828, 325, 328 N.Y.S.2d
817, 820 (1971) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
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the second action sought to apply collateral estoppel to preclude
the relitigation of previously determined facts to defeat a person
who had not been a party to the prior action. The majority
opined collateral estoppel to hold that a prior determination of
fact is binding only on parties to the first action, or their privies.
The court then proceeded to examine the various relationships
between the parties to the former and current actions to determine
whether or not a sufficient jural relationship existed to bind the
administratrix to the prior, and adverse, determination. By adhering to the traditional conceptions of privity,"2 the court found
the facts that the absentee owner in action one and the plaintiff
administratrix in action two were husband and wife, the decedent's parents, as well as the sole distributees, were of no
"compelling legal significance. '5 3 The court was not impressed
by the defendants' attempts to show the existence of a jural relationship because of the fact that the administratrix and husband
had identical interests in proving the decedent free from negligence, and both would have benefitted from a death action re5
covery.
Nor, would the court find that privity had been
created by section 388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law'r In the
absence of the required privity, the court was compelled to grant
Mrs. Molino her day in court. A failure to do so, said the majority, would have been a denial of due process, for, in her capacity
as administratrix, she was a stranger to the prior judgment and,
not having had an opportunity to litigate the issues involved, she
could not be bound by its adverse findings?5 The majority based
its holding on firm legal precedent. With few exceptions, 7 the
New York courts have consistently adhered to the traditional
formulations of privity, and have refused to allow collateral estoppel to be used to defeat a person who was not a party, or in the
52. See text accompanying supra notes 33-41.
53. Instant case at 48, 272 N.E.2d at 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
54. Id. at 49, 272 N.E.2d at 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
55. N.Y. VEH. & TaaF. LAw § 388 (McKinney 1960). The statute creates a basis of
civil liability by imputing the negligence of the driver to the absentee owner in order to
give a third party a direct cause of action against the owner of the vehicle which injured
him. However, the statute does not operate to impute contributory negligence to the
absentee owner, nor does it create privity for the purpose of binding the absentee owner to
an adverse decision. See, e.g., Willsey v. Strawway, 44 Misc. 2d 601, 255 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup.
Ct. 1963), aff'd mem., 22 App. Div. 2d 973, 254 N.Y.S.2d 830 (3d Dep't 1964).
56. See supranote 21.
57. In re Shea's Will, 309 N.Y. 605, 132 N.E.2d 864 (1956) (judgment against family
corporation also binding on stockholders).
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classic jural relationship with a party, to a prior action."8 Although the recent Court of Appeals' decision in Schwartze8 announced that the only two requirements for the assertion of collateral estoppel were an identity of interests and an opportunity
to be heard, the facts of that case were concerned solely with a
problem of mutuality. Therefore, in deciding a question which
was essentially one of privity, the court in the instant case did
not feel compelled to follow its previous holding.
Speaking for the three dissenters, Mr. Justice Burke would
have granted the defendants' motion to assert an affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. The dissent felt that the sole issue
involved was that of decedent's negligence, which had been firmly established in the federal action. 60 The dissenters' rationale
for denying the administratrix a separate day in court rested on
two concurrent considerations: the public interest in preventing
repetitious litigation and the desire to prevent inconsistent verdicts.61 To effectuate these policies the dissent would have ignored the traditional, technical notions of privity which the
majority found so conclusive. Finding that "[a] resort to abstract
notions and generalities relating to privity" was inappropriate,6 2
the dissent would have looked to a more functional approach
to privity such as that established in Bruszewski v. United States. 3
Even though the facts of Schwartz dealt with a mutuality issue,
the dissent implied that the case sought to introduce a practical
and functional approach, which looked to the realities of each
situation, to all aspects of res judicata. Therefore, the dissenters
felt that because the prior federal action had conclusively established that "the Molinos had a 'full and fair opportunity' in a
trial on issues that are identical,"64 the sole prerequisites of
Schwartz had been satisfied and the decision of the appellate
division should have been affirmed.
The New York law of collateral estoppel gave the Molino
family a unique strategic option when sued in the federal action.
Their first alternative was to bring a countersuit in federal court.
58. Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Trans. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933);
Rathbone v. Hooney, 58 N.Y. 463 (1874).
59. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.YS.2d 955 (1969). See supra note 48.
60. Instant case at 54, 272 N.E.2d at 328, 323 N.Y.5.2d at 825.
61. Id. at 50, 54, 272 N.E.2d at 326, 328, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 821, 825.
62. Id. at 51, 272 N.E.2d at 327, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
63. 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir. 1950) . See text at supra note 32.
64. Instant case at 54, 272 N.E.2d at 328, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
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The sole method in which this choice could be effected was for
the mother, as administratrix, to initiate a separate action against
Prodoti and Putnam County which would probably have been
consolidated. 65 Practically speaking, however, the injection of
a countersuit, which often invites the jury to balance the fault
of the litigants, would have been tactically unwise for the Molinos.
Given the present state of New York law, the most advantageous
course for the Molinos was their second alternative-to await the
outcome of the federal litigation. If Prodoti lost, they could rely
on Schwartz to assert collateral estoppel offensively. If he won,
the absent administratrix's cause of action would be protected by
the privity doctrine. The latter contingency became the situation of the instant case. By allowing the Molinos to relitigate
the question of their daughter's negligence which had been conclusively established in the federal action, the court created a
situation where a most paradoxical result could occur. That is,
in the very possible event that the administratrix prevailed in
the second action against Prodoti, each party, litigating the very
same facts in two separate actions, would have been found negligent in one suit and free from negligence in the other. To open
the door for a situation in which even one negligent person may,
by legal stratagem, recover would clearly seem offensive to New
York public policy. Such an outrageous situation is certainly exacerbated where two negligent parties may be allowed to recover
in separate actions.
While the privity requirement of collateral estoppel is well
grounded on New York law,66 its application to the instant case
is especially dubious in view of the fact that the decedent's mother
and father, who were also the decedent's sole distributees, sought
to prove the same thing in both actions-their daughter's freedom
from negligence. Despite their awareness of these realities, 7 the
majority of the Court of Appeals in the instant case nevertheless
felt compelled to apply the traditional categorical conceptions of
the privity doctrine which mechanically dictated the result: the
Molino family was entitled to a second opportunity to litigate
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (a). (Cases pending before the court may be consolidated when
they contain "a common question of law or fact.")
66. First Nat'l Bank v. Shuler, 153 N.Y. 163, 47 N.E. 262 (1897); Collins v. Hydorn,
135 N.Y. 320, 32 N.E. 69 (1892); Rathbone v. Hooney, 58 N.Y. 463 (1874).
67. Instant case at 48, 272 N.E.2d at 825, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
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the question of their daughter's negligence. The majority was of
the opinion that because the decedent's mother and father stood
in different legal capacities, the actions of the father in the federal action could not adequately represent the interests of the
absent mother who was therefore entitled to a separate suit as
administratrix. It is interesting to note that while the court has
often defined privity so narrowly that one individual was held
to be two legal persons, each with a separate cause of action,68 it
has also seen fit to expand the jural relation to include parties who
were not physically before the court when it was felt that privity
was being used as a subterfuge to escape the effects of an unfavorable judgment. 69 Yet, even in view of these widely divergent
conceptions of privity, the majority in the instant case chose to
rely on an especially narrow formulation of the doctrine to reach
the conclusion that, despite the various legal relationships in
which they stood, the husband and wife failed to satisfy its requirements. Certainly to suggest the abandonment of privity
would be folly. However, since its mechanical application may
often work an injustice by overlooking the realities of a situation,
it is suggested that its implementation be based on a realistic
and practical standard which is shaped to the unique contours
of each case.
A corresponding solution to this problem which often results in repetitious litigation, with the concomitant possibility
of inconsistent verdicts, is couched in terms of the adoption of
a compulsory counter-claim rule.7" However, notwithstanding
its utility in certain contexts, such a coercive rule is not a panacea
for problems such as those which are exemplified in the instant
case. The federal rule will compel a "pleader," the legal equivalent of a "party," to bring all of his claims arising out of a "single
68. In City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Silberberg, 280 N.Y. 424, 429-30, 21 N.E.2d
493, 494 (1939) the court held that "an adjudication for or against a person litigating
an issue solely in his individual right or interest does not conclude him in a subsequent
prosecution ... to which he is a party only in his representative capacity." (The guarantor of mortgage certificates was not bound in a suit undertaken in his capacity as trustee
when suing the same defendant, in a second action, as representative of the certificate
holders.)
69. In re Shea's Will, 309 N.Y. 605, 132 N.E.2d 864 (1956). (A judgment against a
family corporation also held binding on stockholders.)
70. See, e.g., Comment, Nonparties and Preclusion by Judgment: The Privity Rule
Reconsidered,56 CALIF. L. REv. 1098, 1122 (1968).
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transaction or occurrence." 7' 1 Therefore, unless the plaintiff ad-

ministratrix is defined as being in privity with the party, her
husband, she would remain outside the purview of the rule, free
in a subsequent action to assert any claim-even one arising
from the same occurrence. Any viable solution to a problem of
repetitious litigation, such as the instant case illustrates, must
therefore be found within an expansion of the scope and content
of the privity doctrine. The dissent in the instant case attempted
to introduce such a solution by endeavoring to formulate a functional and pragmatic approach to "privity," just as the Court of
Appeals in Schwartz introduced a functional and pragmatic approach to "mutuality." The result of the instant case indicates
that the majority of the Court of Appeals is ready to adopt a
flexible and functional approach when dealing with mutuality,
but prefers to adhere to a more formalistic, conceptualistic approach when dealing with privity. In order to fulfill its perception of due process of law, which apparently mandates a strict
adherence to traditional notions of privity, the court is willing
to pay the price of repetitious litigations and inconsistent verdicts.
It is submitted that such a price is extremely high and, in the
light of related procedural developments, 2 the genus of privity
which the court currently demands to fulfill due process, may be
archaic as well as unnecessary. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have, subject to carefully measured procedural safeguards,
dispensed with the privity requirement for class actions. 73 This
detachment from the classical prerequisite of an intraclass jural
relationship can be seen as a penumberal refutation of the traditional standards required to fulfill due process of law. However,
despite the bold steps taken in the federal system, the New York
Court of Appeals has continued to cling tenaciously to the privity
requirement, thereby seriously impairing the utility of the New
York class action device.7 4 Similarly, by demanding a rigid, conceptualistic genus of privity in the application of collateral
estoppel, the court has likewise impaired that doctrine's usefulness in terminating litigation.
71.
72.
73.
Rule, 71
74.

FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a).
See supra note 42.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3). See Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal
COLUm. L. Rv. 609 (1971).
See supranote 42.
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It is submitted that the spirit of pragmatism and functionalism which pervade the federal system should similarly be introduced by the Court of Appeals into the New York law of
collateral estoppel. The court should abandon its archaic and
impractical standards and should recognize, in dealing with privity, as it has in dealing with mutuality, that due process of law
and reality are not incompatible.
JAMES W. GRESENS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A DRIVER INVOLVED IN AN
ACCIDENT RESULTING IN PROPERTY DAMAGE CAN BE REQUIRED BY
STATUTE TO STOP AND IDENTIFY HIMSELF TO THE OTHER DRIVER

On August 20, 1960, defendant Byers was involved in an
automobile accident which resulted in damage to another car.
Two days later he was charged in a two-count indictment with two
misdemeanor violations of the California Vehicle Code. The first
count charged him with passing another vehicle without maintaining the "safe distance" required by law1 and the second count
with a violation of California's "hit and run" statute. This
statute requires the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in damage to any property, including vehicles, to stop
at the scene of the accident and give his name and address to the
other driver.2 Byers demurred to the second count on the ground
that it violated his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
His demurrer was sustained by the California Supreme Court,
which held that compliance confronted him with "substantial
hazards of self-incrimination," but upheld the statute by inserting a use restriction on the information disclosed. The California
court found Byers not liable because he could not have anticipated
the imposition of a use restriction. 3 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 4 Held, the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is not infringed by a state statute which requires
a motorist involved in an accident to stop at the scene and give his
name and address. Californiav. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
1. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 21750 (West Supp. 1971).
2. Id. § 20002 (a) (1).
3. Byers v. Justice Court for Ukiah Judicial Dist., 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1057, 458 P.2d
465, 478, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 566 (1969).
4. 397 U.S. 1035 (1970).

